Author Sharri Markson & Tucker Carlson along with commentary from Global Security expert Jeff Capella below.
Preliminary report by Jeffrey D. Cappella:
A frighteningly honest discussion about why our representatives abase themselves to the Chinese communist party and how that abasement undermines accountability for the Chinese communist party pandemic Wuhan covid-19.
PURPOSE IS IN THE HAND OF THE BEHOLDER; THE DANGER OF OUTSOURCING DUAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY LIKE GAIN OF FUNCTION RESEARCH TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Dual purpose technology refers to technology that possesses military and civilian applications. (1) For example the ballistic missile technology the nazi regime used to bombard London with V-2 rockets was the same technology (and in some cases the same scientists) used to take man to the moon. This does not mean dual purpose technology is inherently “bad” or “good”. Rather dual purpose technology is an enabler for whatever action a particular actor is looking to pursue. Purpose of a technology rests in the hand of the beholder.
PURPOSE IS IN THE HAND OF THE BEHOLDER
The potential for dual purpose technology to be applied towards military or civilian applications and or a legitimate or illegitimate manner is directly determined by the nature of actor that possesses said dual purpose technology. For instance take a child mannequin. If you see a child mannequin in children’s department store said mannequin is rightfully considered benign and non-threatening. If you find the exact same child mannequin in a convicted child molester’s house that child mannequin takes on an entirely different connotation. National security concerns posed by dual purpose technology enabling potential / actual hostile state or sub state actors is exactly what prompted the United States to form the Bureau of Industry and Security dual use export licenses (2) and directly apply to dual purpose technology like gain of function research.
RISK AND REWARDS POSED BY GAIN OF FUCTION RESEARCH
The risk and rewards presented by biological science are great. Subsequently to ensure United States economic competitiveness research in biological science should be vigorously pursued. That said such vigorous pursuit should not be reckless. The concerns on the impact of dual purpose nature of biological sciences are significant. So much so that the United States government formed the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to oversee as well as try to manage the risk. (2) The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity concerns where particularly clear when it comes to “gain of function” research. (3) Concerns regarding dual purpose technology like gain of function research become more acute when outsourced to areas populated by hostile regimes like the Chinese communist party.
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S POLICY OF FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The initial positive response to China’s economic reforms of 1979 where tempered by the initial military focus of said “openness”. (4) Hope that China would join the community of responsible nations further harmed by Chinese communist party’s acts of economic belligerency to include violations of the agreements made to include China into global economic organizations like the World Trade Organization (5) and currency manipulation.(6) Of particular concern is the increasing nature of the scope, scale and most importantly focus of Chinese Communist Party acts of industrial and economic espionage and predatory trade practices. (7) Of particular concern to the Chinese communist pandemic Wuhan COVID-19 is the Chinese communist party’s consistent policy of forcing foreign direct investors to transfer technology to the Chinese communist party. (
CAPABILITY PLUS INTENT; THE RISE OF THE “CHINESE COCKTAIL”
The United States intelligence community defines threat as capability plus intent. Such broader analysis is then amalgamated with socioeconomic and technological trends to extract operational insight. Such an analytical framework provides guidance in how to think about United States national security concerns posed by the Chinese communist party.
For the past 22 years the Chinese communist party standing doctrine (9) against the United States focused on leveraging “grey zone conflict” and includes asymmetric approaches to counter current United States conventional and strategic military superiority. Some of the key aspect of Chinese communist party strategic doctrine entitled “unrestricted warfare” includes but is not limited to the use of biological weapons, information warfare, financial warfare and law fare.
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CLANDESTINE BIOWEAPONS PROGRAM; THE DUAL PURPOSE NATURE OF WUHAN NATIONAL “BIOSAFETY” LABORATORY
Since 2006 the United States intelligence communist has with a significant degree of confidence assessed the Chinese communist party maintains a clandestine bioweapon program. Such assessment is underwritten by the Chinese communist party purposeful lack of transparency regarding the offensive bioweapons program the Chinese communist party that existed prior to signing on to the 1984 Biological Weapons Convention. (10) Concerns surrounding Chinese communist party lack of transparency on Chinas offensive bioweapons program are exemplified by the dual purpose nature of the Wuhan national “biosafety” laboratory.
While Wuhan national “biosafety” laboratory does possess civilian applications given the dual purpose of said biological research coupled with the hostile nature that defines the Chinese communist party there is a reasonable probability that the Chinese communist party also uses the Wuhan national biosafety laboratory to conduct bioweapons research as well. Suspicions and or probability of the Chinese communist party using Wuhan national biosafety laboratory to conduct bioweapons research are further reinforced by:
1. The Chinese communist party’s continued hostility towards the United States
2. The Chinese communist party’s continued pursuit of asymmetric counters to United States conventional, strategic military superiority
3. The totalitarian nature of Chinese communist party translating into the lack of any indigenous accountability of Chinese communist party
4. The lack of transparency regarding Chinese communist party biosciences effort or Chinese communist party activities in general. Indeed autocratic regimes possess greater advantages when it comes to strategic deception / denial
5. The Chinese communist party lack of transparency / outright dishonesty regarding the specifics of the Wuhan national biosafety laboratory role Chinese communist party pandemic Wuhan COVID-19
While the above fact pattern constitutes only some of the numerous reasons illustrating why outsourcing dual purpose technology like gain of function research should not be outsourced to geographic regions occupied by hostile actors like the Chinese communist party some key take aways can be gleaned. Some of the more significant key take aways include but are not limited to:
1. Gain of function research presents incredible possibilities as well as unique and serious risks / dangers
2. The dual purpose nature of gain of function research and subsequent risk of gain of function research potentially furthering bio weapons programs was well known since 2015
3. The motives of the Chinese communist party incentivizing foreign direct investment had continues to have a significant military application / context
4. The Chinese communist party has maintained an increasingly hostile view / stance towards the United States and other allied actors for the past 20 plus years
5. The Chinese communist party belligerency possesses no boundaries and actively operates outside traditional conventional / strategic military means
6. A part of Chinese communist party asymmetric strategy against the United States and allies centers on economic espionage and forced technological transfer
7. The United States intelligence communist maintains a there is a significant probability the Chinese communist party maintains a clandestine offensive bioweapons program
8. There is a reasonable possibility the Chinese communist party diverted gain of function research conducted at Wuhan national “biosafety” laboratory to support a clandestine bioweapons program
The above realities constitute only the tip of the iceberg why outsourcing dual purpose technology to geographic regions occupied by hostile actors like the Chinese communist party is both dangerous to United States national security and global stability. The very realities that Dr. Fauci has demonstrated as being either criminally incompetent via a lack of awareness, arrogantly dismissive in support of reckless careerism and or outright dishonest in the hopes of escaping accountability.
2. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Dual Use Export Licenses- https://www.bis.doc.gov/…/doc_download/91-cbc-overview
3a. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) – https://osp.od.nih.gov/…/national-science-advisory…/
3b. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB): Enhancing Oversight of Dual Use Research – https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/50058.pdf
3c. A Report of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EVALUATION AND OVERSIGHT OF PROPOSED GAIN-OFFUNCTION RESEARCH – https://web.archive.org/…/NSABB_Final_Report…
4. The initial focus of the Chinese communist party economic “openness” centered on incentives foreign direct investment in economic sectors that possess a maximum amount of dual purpose technology.
5. 2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance United States Trade Representative February 2019 – https://ustr.gov/…/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on…
6. Treasury Designates China as a Currency Manipulator – https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm751
7a. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage 2002 – https://irp.fas.org/ops/ci/docs/2002.pdf
7b. Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace 2009 – 2011 – https://www.dni.gov/…/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf
7c. Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace Report 2018, National Counter Intelligence Executive – https://www.dni.gov/…/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf
8a. Forced Technology Transfer (FTT) – https://www.investopedia.com/forced-technology-transfer….
8b. How Chinese Companies Facilitate Technology Transfer from the United States – https://www.uscc.gov/…/How%20Chinese%20Companies…
8c. Investigation: Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation – https://ustr.gov/…/sect…/section-301-china/investigation
8. d OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Docket No. USTR-2018-0005 https://ustr.gov/…/files/files/Press/Releases/301FRN.pdf
8e. China Section 301-Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process – https://ustr.gov/…/section-301…/34-billion-trade-action
8f. OFFICE of the UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE March 22 REPORT, 2018 FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 – https://ustr.gov/…/301%20Draft%20Exec%20Summary%203.22…
8g. OFFICE of the UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION November 20, 2018 – https://ustr.gov/…/301Investi…/301%20Report%20Update.pdf
9a. Unrestricted Warfare Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999 – https://www.oodaloop.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf
9b. Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America – https://www.amazon.com/Unrestricted-Warfare…/dp/1626543054
10a. 2005 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments:
10b. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends Updated February 20, 2008, page 14:
10c. China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States – https://fas.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html
10e. ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS July 2010 Prepared by the U.S. Department of State, Page 10